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Use of Chemical Tests as Evidence of Intoxication
By TIPTON

L

EED *

The 1954 Session of the General Assembly was faced with the
serious problem of the mounting death toll on Kentucky highways. Campaigns by the newspapers and various law-enforcement and civic safety groups aided tremendously in trying to
keep down the traffic deaths, but the people felt that safety campaigns and safety slogans were inadequate. Pressure from traffic
courts and from an alarmed public has made itself manifest in a
new statute.
With the passage of House Bill 16, the 1954 Session of the Kentucky General Assembly placed its stamp of approval upon the
use of chemical tests to aid the courts in determining the sobriety
of automobile drivers.
Section 189.520 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes as amended
reads as follows:
(1) No person under the influence of intoxicating liquors or
narcotic drugs shall operate a vehicle that is not a motor
vehicle upon a highway.
(2) No person shall operate a motor vehicle on a highway
while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or
narcotic drugs.
(8) No peace officer or Highway Patrolman shall fail to enforce rigidly this section.
(4) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, wherein the defendant
is charged with having operated a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood as determined at the
time of making a chemical analysis of his blood, urine,
breath or other bodily substance, shall give rise to the
following presumptions:
(a) If there was 0.05 per cent or less by weight of
alcohol in such blood, it shall be presumed that the
defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating
liquor;
* Third year law student, University of Kentucky. Member, Kentucky Legisla-
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(b) If there was more than 0.05 per cent, but less than
0.15 per cent by weight of alcohol in such blood, such
fact shall not constitute a presumption that the defendant either was or was not under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered,
together with other competent evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant;
(c) If there was 0.15 per cent or more by weight of
alcohol in such blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
(5) The provisions of subsection (4) of this section shall
not be construed as limiting the introduction of any
other competent evidence bearing upon the question
of whether the defendant was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.
(6) No person may be compelled to submit to any test
specified in subsection (4) of this section, but his refusal to submit to such test may be commented upon
by the prosecution in the trial against any person
charged with operating any vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Chemical tests of the blood in connection with alleged drunkenness have been used for several years. Maine passed such
a statute in 1989,1 and similar statutes have been enacted in
several states.2 Some cities have been using various kinds of
chemical tests even where there is no such legislation.' The law
as enacted by the General Assembly does not specify any particular type of chemical test, although Section 4 of the Act refers
to making a chemical analysis of the blood, urine, breath or other
bodily substance. The effect of this statute is to eliminate the
necessity of producing expert witnesses to prove or disprove the
chemical effect of alcohol in the blood. This gives full recognition
to years of scientific research devoted to making the alcoholic
content of the blood evidence of, or against, intoxication.
The application of chemical tests to allegedly intoxicated.
drivers has accomplished two results. It has frequently disclosed
to the enforcement officer that the operator suffered from something entirely different from excessive alcohol. There are cases
where diabetics and persons suffering from hypertension or shock
IME.

Rxv. STAT. c. 19, sec. 121 (1944).
'IND. STAT. (Bums) sec. 47-2003(2) (1952); N. Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS
SERVIcE, VE ICLE AND TRA-FmC, sec. 70 (5) (1952).
'Lawrence v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. App. 2d 6, 127 P. 2d 931 (1942).
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have been arrested as drunks. In fact, there are some sixty-four
pathological conditions which resemble intoxication. 4 The chemical test, then, will protect the innocent motorist. On the other
hand, the test may satisfy the defendant that he hasn't a chance
of acquittal and cause him to plead guilty, thus saving the taxpayer and himself time and expense. If the defendant insists on
going to trial, despite the test, having consented to it, he is practically certain to be convicted if the test shows an excess of 0.15
per cent by weight of alcohol in his blood. The judge will no
longer be plagued with doubts, and juries, accustomed to taking
sides against the police in such cases, will do their duty and
protect the community rather than the intoxicated motorist.
When a similar bill was pending before the Judiciary Comnittee of the legislature of Massachusetts, the editor of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly requested that an article be written by
Lawrence G. Brooks of the First District Court of Eastern Middlesex. This article was not submitted to the Kentucky General
Assembly, but it presents the identical problems confronting the
members of the Courts and Criminal Procedure Committee of the
House of Representatives, when the bill was submitted to them
for consideration.
Every judge who sits without a jury in a criminal court is
plagued from time to time with doubt as to whether the
defendant charged with "drunken driving" was in fact under
the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of his arrest.
This doubt, if reasonable, should be resolved in favor of the
defendant. With the average juryman, however, reasonable
doubt is not a factor. He does not like policemen at whose
hands he may on some occasions have suffered an indignity.
He may recall that on more than one occasion he considered
himself lucky to have driven home after a party without
having been arrested. He gives no thought to the public
menace aspect and so, more often than not juries acquit
defendants in these cases. 5
Here is a common type of case used as an illustration by
Justice Brooks: A police officer, noticing a car following an erratic
course, stops the car and smells alcohol on the driver's breath.
He asks the driver to walk a few steps. Then he arrests him and
'Brooks, Chemical Tests for "Driving Under The Influence," 37 MAss. L. Q.
No. 4, 10 at 18 (1952).
1Id. at 10.
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takes him to the police station where he is interrogated, booked,
and placed in jail. He is likely to remain overnight since the
police are reluctant, in spite of statutory requirements, to permit
defendants charged with liquor offenses to telephone for some
hours after their arrest.
The next day the driver, quite sober, may plead not guilty
and go to trial or ask for a continuance in order to get a lawyer.
At the trial the defendant is faced by the arresting officer and
desk sargeant who will testify as to his breath, thick speech and
glassy eyes. The defendant will testify that he had one or two
beers, that he had worked twenty straight hours and was groggy
from loss of sleep. 6

The judge knows that policemen are loyal to each other and
when one officer brings in a driver for drunken driving the other
doesn't want to let him down. The officer, having detected the
odor of alcohol, might reasonably have arrested the man on the
ground that the latter had been driving while under the influence
of alcohol. "Few mathematical equations are surer than that an
automobile operator with an alcohol breath plus an accident plus
a police officer equals an arrest for operating under the influence."7 The officer wants to convict, first, because he probably
thinks the defendant is guilty, and, secondly, because he doesn't
want to be sued for assault and battery or false arrest.
The case just mentioned is a reasonable facsimile of the hundreds of cases that face our courts each week. The evidence on
both sides is suspect, and yet evidence could have been presented
which might well have conclusively convicted or exonerated the
defendant. That evidence is now, by statute, available to the
courts in Kentucky.
With the passage of this statute Kentucky has exposed herself
to an interesting body of criminal law that has been built up in
connection with chemical tests. In many respects it presents no
legal problems different from those raised by the usual methods
of examination used by officers. However, since the very nature
of these chemical tests requires an extraction of body fluids or
breath, they might be termed an invasion of bodily security. One
can readily see that the constitutional privilege against self-in6

Id. at

7Id.

10-12.

at 12.
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crimination naturally has appeared appropriate to defense attorneys as the basis for objection to the admissability of such test
results. It is this aspect of the statute that the writer here wishes
to examine.
Section 6 of the new statute supposedly puts the teeth into
the new law and at the same time limits its application. No person may be compelled to submit to any chemical test. That is the
limitation. Yet if he refuses, his refusal to submit may be commented upon by the prosecution. Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution specifically provides that an accused cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself. The new statute, in line
with similar statutes in other states, carefully observes this provision. The issue of consent then will be the greatest single question to be determined as more and more cases appear under this
statute. If the test is voluntary, how and to whom must the consent be given? Who will determine this, the judge or the jury?
Can an intoxicated person give his consent? These are but a few
of the problems concerned with consent only.
A review of court cases in other states reveals that, in most
instances, the results of the tests have been held admissable where
there was failure to resist. In one Ohio case,9 the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test was allowed to be commented
upon at the trial. The court's opinion stated that the defendant's
constitutional rights were not violated in that the constitutional
inhibition against self-incrimination relates only to disclosures by
utterance. In a similar case in Iowa,"° the admission of a test was
affirmed over the objection of the defendant, who said he submitted to the test because he thought the law required him to
do so. A 1945 Oregon case"- admitted the results of a chemical test
taken while the defendant was unconscious. His automobile had
turned over and he remained in an unconscious state for fortyeight hours. The majority held that admitting the evidence did
not amount to compelling the defendant to testify against himself because evidence of the result of the analysis of the blood
sample was not his testimony. The strongest point of the opinion
8 State v. Dugid, 53 Ariz. 276, 72 1. 2d 435 (1941); Spitler v. State, 221 Ind.
121, 46 N. E. 2d 591 (1943).
'State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E. 2d 265 (1938).
"'State v. Werling, 234 Iowa 1109, 13 N. W. 2d 318 (1944).
" State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945).
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consists of the analogy of the evidence under attack to that of
fingerprints procured under compulsion which evidence is universally admitted.
This writer believes that the issue of consent will be the
tempest in the teapot that may render the statute relatively ineffective. It was felt in the legislature that, with a lack of precedent concerning chemical tests in the state plus the added factor
of Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, to make the tests
compulsory would be completely hazardous. No state has made
the test compulsory and compulsion was the basis, in a 1940 Texas
case, for holding the result of a chemical test inadmissable.
The cases concerning chemical tests in other states may have
gone so far so fast that only legislation may clear up the issue of
self-incrimination. Legislation then may be the answer in Kentucky if the question of consent and the problem of self-incrimination render the present statute ineffective in our courts.
Does Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibit compulsion in this type of statute? The answer can well be in the
negative for two perfectly valid reasons. First, the English and
American history concerning the privilege of freedom from selfincrimination seems to be limited strictly to oral admissions of
guilt. In England the privilege developed about 1680 as a restriction upon the cruel religious persecutions for heresy in the
church courts and primarily for the purpose of stripping such
courts of their increasing authority, so that they might be relegated to their proper place below the authority of the common
law court. This concept grew into the common law courts and
the general result was that no person should be bound to testify
against himself on any charge in any court.1 3 A check of historical
dates will place the settlement of the American colonies at about
this same time and it is of small wonder that the privilege was
written into our Federal Constitution and many state constitutions. One authority has stated:
This privilege against self-incrimination came up thra our
colonial history as a privilege against physical compulsion
and against the moral compulsion that an oath to a revengeful God commands of a pious soul.... In all the cases that
have made the formative history of this privilege and have
' Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. App. 59,3, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1940).
138 WIG oBm, ENm.cE see. 2250, p. 298 (3rd ed. 1940).
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lent to it its color, all that the accused asked for was a fair
trial before a fair and impartial jury of his peers, to whom
he should not be forced by the state or sovereignty to confess his guilt of the fact charged. 14
Why then has the privilege so over extended itself? Professor
Wigmore says that the privilege exists mainly in order to stimulate the prosecution to a full and fair search for evidence procurable by its own exertions, and to deter it from a lazy and
pernicious reliance upon the accused's confessions. 5 Is it not
fair, then, to assume that the real purpose behind the privilege
was, and is, to prevent torture of an accused in order to obtain
a confession? A confession, in fact, that may not be true? Is not
the main objective behind the rule the prevention of convicting
an innocent man who may have confessed under racking pain?
The answer, then, becomes easy as applied to modem day chemical tests to ascertain sobriety.
Is there any physical pain or torture connected with breathing
into a Drunkometer or being pricked by a needle? Will the evidence procured lead to a false confession? It is obvious that there
is little pain and no torture. More obvious is the fact that the
evidence obtained will not lead to a false confession that would
convict an innocent man. On the contrary, it is vital evidence
that will lead to the whole truth. It might lead to complete
exoneration of the defendant or complete conviction. That is the
truth for which the courts have been searching. One need look
no farther thai the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence Rule 205 to find the modem thinking on this. Subsection
(b) of that Rule states: "No person has a privilege to refuse to
furnish or to permit the taking of samples of body fluids or substances for analysis."
This writer's second contention is that the statute could and
should have been made compulsory by the legislature without
fear of conflict with Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Even if it is assumed that ordinarily it is a violation of the privilege to compel one to submit to a chemical test to determine sobriety, it is, nevertheless, indisputable that it is within the state's
police power to regulate the use of the highways for the public
"Pitman, R. C., The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763 at 783 (1935).
'WIGMORE,
supra note 18, sec. 2251 at p. 309 ff.
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safety and protection. 6 A 1940 New Hampshire decision states
very explicitly that the public has no vested rights in the highways and that the state may regulate and forbid travel or may
permit it under such terms as it imposes. If a state can deny
the privilege of highway use then it can provide the conditions
under which they can be used. Thus it seems that if a condition
is imposed requiring that a driver must submit to a chemical test
if he uses the highway, he is considered to have waived the constitutional privilege. It has never been doubted that the privilege
can be waived.'"
The next two years should be ample time to observe the workability of the statute recently enacted. If the problems anticipated here do materialize then it will behoove the next session
of the legislature to take a compelling statute into full consideration. If the mandate from the people is as strong and as forceful
as this writer expects, then the problem of drunken driving on
Kentucky highways will force the privilege of self-incrimination
into a remote corner insofar as it concerns this particular section
of the law.
" State v. Brown, 142 Md. 27, 119 A. 684 (1922); 1
sec. 21 (1935).
State v. Cox, 91 N. H. 187, 16A 2d 508 (1940).
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"People v. Johnson, 228 N. Y. 332, 127 N. E. 186 (1920); U. S. v. Wetmore,
218 F. 227 (1914); WiGMonE, supra note 13, sec. 2275.

